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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOHN KIRILUK,

Case No. 970200
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
In response to issues raised on appeal, the state distorts
facts and makes inapplicable procedural arguments. On the merits,
the state fails to provide factual or legal analysis, compelling
the determination that this Court should reverse the conviction
and remand the case for a new trial as set forth in the opening
Brief of Appellant, and as further set forth herein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE SUPERFICIALLY ADDRESSES KIRILUK'S
INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA.
A. THE STATE'S "DISPUTE" CONCERNING KIRILUK'S INVOCATION OF
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL LACKS ANALYSIS.
In a single-paragraph discussion relating to the first issue
on appeal,1 the state acknowledges that Kiriluk invoked the
1

Kiriluk's opening Brief of Appellant contains an incomplete
statement regarding the standard of review applicable to the first
issue on appeal, which concerns the trial court's error in failing
to suppress statements made by Kiriluk after he invoked rights per
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . Kiriluk stated, "This
Court will review the trial court's factual findings for clear
error, and the conclusions of law under a correctness standard
providing no deference to the trial court." (Opening Brief at 1
(cites omitted).)
The proper standard applicable here is
identified in State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862 (Utah App. 1997):
"When a trial court bases its 'ultimate conclusions concerning
the waiver of defendant's Miranda rights...upon essentially
undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an
officer's] colloquy with defendant,' its conclusions present
(continued...)

right to silence during the in-custody interrogation, but claims
the invocation did not trigger the right to counsel. In support,
the state simply cites to Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459
(1994). (See State's Brief at 20.)

The state fails to provide

factual or legal analysis with respect to its position. (Id.)
In addition, the state's claim lacks support in the record
and in the law. As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant
("Opening Brief"), Carr testified that during in-custody
interrogation, he informed Kiriluk that drugs were found in the
apartment. Carr told Kiriluk, "You're going to be arrested for
that, okay? Now, [do] you want [to] make any statements in regard
to that. [K]eeping in mind everything about you do have the right
to remain silent. You do have the right to have an attorney,
things of that nature." (R. 1204:33.)
Kiriluk responded "I don't."

conditions

of Kiriluk's

cooperation,

(R. 12 04:34.) Carr

the

i.e. "keeping in mind"

Kiriluk's right to remain silent and "to have
reasonable police officer defining

defined

an attorney."

A

the circumstances would have

understood the refusal to cooperate to be an invocation of the
rights defined.

See Davis, 512 U.S. 459 (right to counsel must be

1

(...continued)
questions of law which we review under a correction of error
standard."
Id. at 866 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 864 P. 2d 894 (Utah App.
1993)) . As stated in State v. Labrum, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah
App. 1998), normally this Court would give deference to the trial
court's findings: "However, the logic underlying this deference to
the sentencing court does not apply when, as in this case," the
court has based its findings on a transcript. Id. at 3 8 n.6. Since
the findings relevant to the first issue are based in a transcript,
this Court should give no deference to the trial court here.
2

articulated sufficiently so that reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have understood it to be a request to invoke
right to counsel); (see R. 385 (Carr admits that if he had
realized Kiriluk said, "I don't," he would have discontinued
interrogation because Kiriluk invoked Miranda rights)). The state
does not dispute the clear transcript. As much as Kiriluk invoked
the right to remain silent, he also invoked the right to counsel.
In a separate statement, which also lacks analysis, the
state claims that in closing argument, defense

counsel

argued

that Kiriluk "never requested a lawyer" and he "cooperated with
police in their investigation." (State's Brief at 20.) The state
fails to identify why counsel's closing argument is pertinent
here. To the extent the state relies on it as "evidence" that
Kiriluk did not invoke the right to counsel, the state's reliance
is misplaced for two reasons.
First, counsel's statement simply reflects the substance of
the trial court's ruling on the matter (see R. 477 where court
determined Kiriluk did not invoke Miranda rights during
interrogation).

Second, counsel's statements in closing argument

months later do not constitute "evidence," see State v. Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citing Leon Shaffer Golnick Adv.,
Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982)
(attorney's unsworn statements do not constitute evidence)), and
likewise do not constitute circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. See State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-26 (Utah
1989) (in considering Miranda issue, court considers total

3

circumstances, including characteristics of accused and details
of interrogation).
The facts surrounding the interrogation support invocation
of Miranda rights. The law prohibited the officers from further
questioning under the circumstances. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 97-98 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981); People v. St.Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61, 67-68 (111. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920, 922-23 (Pa. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989); Christopher v. Fla., 824 F.2d 836,
840-41 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1077 (1988).
B. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT OFFICERS FAILED TO PROVIDE
KIRILUK WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY
BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE SECOND INTERROGATION.
In Point I.D., the state asserts that notwithstanding
Kiriluk's invocation of Miranda rights, "an approximate 2-hour
break" and "fresh Miranda

warning[s]" made subsequent questioning

permissible. (State's Brief at 24-27.) In the Opening Brief,
Kiriluk acknowledged that a suitable break and fresh Miranda
warnings may be sufficient under Michicran v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), to permit later questioning where defendant has invoked
only the right to remain silent. (Opening Brief at 17.)
However, where defendant has invoked the right to counsel,
those steps are inadequate. (Id. at 17-18.) Officers may not
proceed with questioning on any subject unless and until
defendant is provided with the opportunity to consult with an
attorney. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (when accused has invoked
right to counsel, he "is not subject to further interrogation by

4

the authorities until counsel has been made available to him");
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
177 (1991) (once suspect invokes Miranda right to counsel with
regard to one offense, "he may not be reapproached regarding

any

offense unless counsel is present"). 2
Here, although there was a break in the interrogation and
fresh warnings, Carr failed to permit Kiriluk to consult with
counsel before he continued questioning. Kiriluk7s statements
were obtained illegally.

See Dahlquist, 931 P.2d at 866; Smith,

469 U.S. at 97-98; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.
C. THE STATED ARGUMENTS REGARDING PROCEDURAL DEFECTS
MISREPRESENT THE RECORD.

2

The state seems to suggest that the Utah Supreme Court has
relied on Mosley to rule that where a defendant has asserted the
Miranda right to counsel during interrogation, officers may
continue questioning sometime later on another subject. (State's
Brief at 25.) The state cites to State v. Newton, 682 P. 2d 295, 297
(Utah 1984). That case does not stand for that proposition.
In Newton, defendant was appointed counsel pursuant to the 6th
Amendment in January 1982 when he was arrested for aggravated
robbery. In April 1982, an officer met with defendant in connection
with a forgery case. The officer advised defendant of his Miranda
rights and defendant stated he would talk to the officer "without
having an attorney present." .Id. at 296. The Utah Supreme Court
ruled that defendant's rights per Miranda were not violated, since
defendant specifically did not invoke those rights during custodial
interrogation. Newton is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) .
In McNeil, the Court recognized that the 6th Amendment right
to counsel is "offense-specific" while the Miranda right to counsel
is "nonoffense-specific." A defendant who is appointed counsel under the 6th Amendment for one offense, may later waive the Miranda
right to counsel when questioned about other offenses. However,
once defendant has asserted the right to counsel under Miranda
officers are prevented from further questioning with respect to any
crime until defendant has consulted with counsel. McNeil, 501 U.S.
at 177. McNeil specifically disavows the state's claim that officers may continue interrogation on a different subject matter when
defendant has invoked Miranda rights (see State's Brief at 26-27) .
5

The state asks this Court to refrain from ruling on the
merits of the Miranda issue, and to rule that Kiriluk failed to
properly preserve the issue for appeal. (State's Brief at Point
I.B. and C.) The state's argument does not warrant consideration
since Kiriluk properly preserved the Miranda issue.
In the trial court, Kiriluk presented a motion to suppress
evidence obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment.3 The motion
involved the Miranda issue; Kiriluk argued that officers violated
his rights per Miranda. (R. 459; 471-72.)
Specifically, counsel for Kiriluk presented the Miranda
issue to the court as follows:
[John Kiriluk is] at the police station, and he's being
questioned. They receive a phone call, after a search has
been conducted, relating to the narcotics or alleged
narcotic that was found in the apartment. At that point
John invokes his right to Miranda. He clearly has not freely
or voluntarily given his consent. They ask him, "Do you
want to talk about this? Do you want to [be] questioned
about that?" And his response was transcribed as, "I don't."
•

*

*

When there is an invocation of Miranda, even if Miranda has
been given previously, [the duty] is at the very least to
clarify. If there's an invocation of Miranda, the duty we
all would recognize would be to stop questioning. But at the
very least, [the officer] has a duty to clarify. And certainly the tape is going to speak for itself on that issue.
(R. 459; 471-72.)

The state also argued the issue:

PROSECUTOR: As we come here, I think it's clear that the
question is, do you want to make any statements in regard to
anything that went on in your apartment that has to do with
drugs? He says no. If we're taking this to be what
happened. And he says no. He invoked Miranda.
He doesn't say, "I don't want to talk to you," he just
says, "No, I don't want to make any statements about anything that goes on in the apartment about drugs.["] Boom.

3

Kiriluk raised the Fourth Amendment issue in the Opening
Brief at Point II (see also Point II, infra).
6

That's not an invocation
talking about anything, at
officer talks to him about
has nothing to do with the
went on in the apartment.

that he wants to cease or stop
all. And so when the other
wanting to search, that, again,
questions about drugs or what

(R. 465.) Presenting the 4th Amendment and Miranda issues
together to the court in that fashion was efficient and eliminated duplication since the issues overlapped. The trial court
resolved the Miranda issue against Kiriluk before reaching the
4th Amendment issue. (R. 477 (no Miranda violation--Kiriluk's
responses to continued interrogation supported cooperation).)
The issue was properly preserved for appeal; facts and legal
arguments regarding the Miranda violation were presented to the
trial court and the court made a ruling on the matter. (R. 477.)
This Court should review the merits of the issue on appeal.4
D. IN ITS PREJUDICE ARGUMENT, THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES THE
IMPROPER USE OF EVIDENCE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
The state claims that statements obtained in violation of
Miranda were not prejudicial because "evidence of defendant's
guilt was strong." (State's Brief at 27.) In support of that
assertion, the state cites to the testimony of Chablis Scott

4

With respect to the state's claim that Kiriluk made a motion
later regarding the Miranda violation and then withdrew that motion
(see State's Brief at Point I.C.), closer inspection reflects that
the motion was re-designated as a "motion to redact," and related
to statements made by Kiriluk as to whether he was selling drugs
from the apartment. (R. 522-23.)
The new designation suggests the defense intended to argue
that the prejudicial statements concerning other alleged criminal
activity was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. However, the
defense was not required to argue the bases for the "motion to
redact" since the prosecutor agreed not to introduce those
statements into evidence.
Kiriluk has not made a challenge on
appeal relating to the motion to redact or the statements that were
the subject of the motion.
7

(Chablis), Rebecca Mumford (Rebecca) and Jolynn Penrod. The state
disregards that evidence presented through those witnesses was
circumstantial; Chablis and Rebecca presented credibility issues;
and Jolynn was unable to testify with respect to events leading
up to and surrounding the murder. (See Opening Brief, Point I.B.)
The state seems to argue it presented evidence sufficient to
support a conviction. Yet, the "sufficiency" standard is not
enough under the prejudice analysis. Dahlguist, 931 P.2d at 867.
Evidence must be so powerful and cumulative that the error would
not have swayed the jury's judgment. Where the evidence was
circumstantial and clouded with credibility concerns, the error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Id.

Further, the state acknowledges that Kiriluk's statements
were used to prove the state's case. (State's Brief at 28: Kiriluk's "statements consequently corroborated the State's motive
theory".) The state's argument underscores the harm of the error.
POINT II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, KIRILUK ARGUES
A 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION, WHERE THE CONSENT WAS COERCIVE
AND/OR CONSTITUTED THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
A. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT AT POINT II CONCERNING MIRANDA
REMEDIES IS MISPLACED; KIRILUK IS NOT SEEKING A REMEDY UNDER
MIRANDA FOR THE 4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION.
Contrary to the state's assertions (see State's Brief at
29) , in Point II Kiriluk is not seeking 5th Amendment or Miranda
protection in connection with a 4th Amendment violation. Rather,
Kiriluk maintains that the 4th Amendment provides a remedy in
this case for the illegal search. (Opening Brief, Point II.)
Because the state's argument focuses on a 5th Amendment/Miranda

8

remedy, it is misplaced.
Specifically, the state points out that courts considering
the issue of excluding "non-testimonial" evidence obtained in
violation of Miranda or the 5th Amendment, held that
exclusionary

rule

Miranda's

does not provide a remedy. (State's Brief at

30); see U.S. v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1993);
U.S. v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993)
(every federal circuit addressing the issue in terms of a Miranda
violation has reached the conclusion that Miranda

does not pro-

tect against non-testimonial consent to search) ; Cody v. Solem,
755 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (court declines for procedural reasons to address matter as a 4th Amendment issue); U.S.
v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (5th Amendment
does not protect consent obtained in violation thereof). 5
As set forth in Kiriluk's Opening Brief "Kiriluk is not
seeking a remedy under Miranda law for the violation identified
in this Point II. Kiriluk's remedy is under the 4th Amendment and
its Utah counterpart." (Opening Brief at 25 and n. 7.)

In the

cases cited by the state, the defendant either never raised exclusion of the "non-testimonial" evidence under the 4th Amendment, or was procedurally barred from making such an argument.

5

Additional cases cited by the state are inapposite for
various reasons. In Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1151-52
(5th Cir. 1978), the court refused to consider the issue in habeas
corpus proceedings for procedural reasons. In U.S. v. Shlater, 85
F.3d 1251, 1253-54, 1256 (7th Cir. 1996), defendant "invited" and
"encouraged" officers to search his home before he was provided
with his rights per Miranda. Likewise, in U.S. v. Lemon, 550 F.2d
467 (9th Cir. 1977), officers obtained defendant's consent to
search before they provided the Miranda warnings to him.
9

Thus, the issue was not addressed. Kiriluk's issue presents the
4th Amendment overlay, which provides the appropriate remedy.
To begin the analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), considered whether defendant had a
remedy for suppressing an alibi witness's testimony where
authorities questioned defendant in violation of Miranda.

The

defendant named the witness to authorities during the violative
interrogation. The Tucker Court engaged in a two-part inquiry to
determine whether a remedy existed to exclude the "nontestimonial" information.

Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439. The first

part of the inquiry asked whether officers violated Miranda. The
Tucker Court determined that a violation occurred. Id. at 445-46.
In the second part of the analysis, the Court considered
remedies. Miranda appeared to offer the only possible remedy
since there was no other apparent violation alleged to have
occurred and no other basis for excluding the evidence. The Court
determined that the Miranda exclusionary rule served no useful
purpose as a remedy in that case. Tucker, 417 U.S. 447.
In this case, officers obtained consent in violation of
Miranda.

The state admits as much: Carr was at least "negligent"

when he completely disregarded the invocation of Kiriluk's
Miranda rights (State's Brief at 33-34), and Kiriluk invoked his
rights making statements suppressible (id. at 23) . As a result
of the Miranda violation, officers searched Kiriluk's apartment
without a warrant, implicating the 4th Amendment. A remedy under
that provision is available here; exclusion under the 4th

10

Amendment is well-established and will serve a valid purpose.
In the search-and-seizure context the "prime purpose" of the
exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the 4th Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures."

Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446

(quoting U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
The exclusionary rule assumes that police have engaged in
willful or negligent
some right.

conduct which has deprived the defendant of

Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447; (see also State's Brief at

34 (admitting Carr's negligence)).
The state does not dispute Kiriluk7s remedy under the 4th
Amendment here. Exclusion would serve the purpose of requiring
officers to pay attention to a defendant's responses. Officers
should not be allowed to rely on their negligence to circumvent
the requirements of Miranda and 4th Amendment law.

See State v.

Johnson, 576 A.2d 834, 846-47 (N.J. 1990) (court found that
Miranda violation invalidated confession, and poisoned subsequent
consent to search under 4th Amendment); U.S. v. Taft, 769 F.Supp.
1295, 1304-06 (D.Vt. 1991) (consent violated 4th and 5th Amendment rights; rational of Edwards supports that failure to honor
request for counsel creates a coercive situation invalidating
subsequent consent to search).6 The circumstances surrounding

6

In addition to the Miranda violation
it is undisputed that
at the time officers requested consent, Kiriluk was in custody in
the early hours of the morning at the police station. Those factors
are relevant to the total circumstances in determining that consent
was coercive. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1219 (Utah 1993)
(prosecution's burden in showing consent is particularly heavy if
(continued...)
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the consent to search here compel the determination that it was
coercive, in violation of the 4th Amendment.
B. THE EXPLOITATION ANALYSIS IS APPLICABLE AND COMPELLING;
CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, IT WAS SPECIFICALLY AND
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL.
The state admits Kiriluk can prevail on the 4th Amendment
claim where the "consent to search was somehow tainted by the
preceding Miranda violation." (State's Brief at 31.) The state,
however, urges the Court to avoid the merits of the exploitation
analysis and to find that Kiriluk failed to properly preserve the
issue for appeal. The state's urgings are non-meritorious. Kiriluk' s counsel presented the issue to the trial court as follows:
The second issue is, if there is a prior illegality on
the search, if they are there illegally, if -- on the
Miranda issue if he's not invoked his Miranda, if there is
valid consent, is it sufficiently attenuated from the
illegality in this case? Is invokation [sic] of Miranda? And
I would note that when you look at the tape, page 34, and
where there's discussion about Miranda, page 37 is where
there is a discussion of the consent. It's two, two and a
half pages later.
I know the one Utah case talks about attenuation
between the prior illegality, then something that may have
intervened, and then subsequent. In this case we don't
believe there is sufficient attenuation.
(R. 472; see also 459.) The trial court specifically ruled that

6

(...continued)
defendant was in custody); U.S. v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 (5th
Cir. 1973) (arrest is a factor militating against finding consent;
arrestee is more susceptible to possible duress or coercion); U.S.
v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1973) (circumstances
invalidating consent consisted of the following: defendant's
arrest, he was given formal Miranda warnings, the interrogation
over a period of approximately two hours, and the defendant was
held at station house); State v. Rushton, 870 P.2d 1355, 1361
(Mont. 1994) (Miranda violation is a relevant factor negating the
consent to search) .
12

consent was voluntarily given. (R. 479.) 7
With respect to the merits of the issue, the state
incorrectly applies a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to
the matter to determine coercion. That analysis would render the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine meaningless. Indeed, case
law reflects that consent can be voluntary, but invalid as the
fruit of a prior illegality. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602
(1975); U.S. v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1990). Under
the exploitation doctrine, courts consider the proximity in time
between the illegality and otherwise valid consent, intervening
circumstances, and the purpose/flagrancy of the police
misconduct. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993).
Here, the state does not dispute that (1) Kiriluk at least

7

To the extent the state claims that the trial court's
findings were not altogether complete, this Court is required to
assume the trial court found facts in accord with its decision. In
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court
considered a search and seizure issue that involved inadequate
factual findings from the trial court. Id. at 1130. That did not
deter the Utah Supreme Court from ruling on the merits of the
issue. Rather, " [b]ecause the trial court's written findings do
not describe the circumstances giving rise to this case, we look to
the record of the suppression hearing for the relevant facts."
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1129.
The Utah Supreme Court commanded that "when a trial court has
failed to make findings of fact on the record, we will 'assume that
the [trial court found facts] in accord with its decision' whenever
it would be 'reasonable to assume that the court actually made such
findings.'" Id. at 1130 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774,
787-88 & n. 6 (Utah 1991)); see also State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d
1144, 1148-49 (Utah 1996) (appellate court can consider undisputed
facts to dispose of matter). The Lopez court considered facts of
record to support findings that were not expressly made.
Lopez is controlling here. Kiriluk specifically raised the
exploitation issue, and the trial court in Kiriluk's case
explicitly found that the consent was voluntary. (R. 479.) Implicit
in the ruling is that the exploitation argument failed. The issue
is properly before this Court for consideration on the merits.
13

invoked his rights per Miranda with respect to drugs/activities
at the apartment; (2) notwithstanding the invocation, Carr
continued to interrogate Kiriluk regarding that subject; and (3)
without hesitation or a break in the interrogation on the
specific subject matter, within minutes of the invocation, Carr
turned the interrogation over to Winters to obtain consent to
search the apartment for drug-related evidence. (R. 1204: 34-37.)
The state asserts that because Carr was "negligent" in
failing to acknowledge the invocation of Kiriluk's Miranda
rights, the continued interrogation and request to search cannot
be construed as purposeful or flagrant, and that any violation in
any event of the 4th Amendment would not warrant suppression of
the evidence here since no deterrent value would be served.
(State's Brief at 33-35.)
Carr's conduct in disregarding a clear Miranda invocation
was obvious and cannot be condoned. When an officer provides a
suspect with Miranda rights and asks if the suspect is willing to
cooperate keeping those rights in mind, the officer should be
required to listen for the answer and to pay attention to it.
Otherwise, officers will be permitted to trample important rights
on the basis that the officer neglected to pay attention.
Because the exclusionary rule is calculated to compel respect for
constitutional rights, application of the rule would serve an
important purpose in this case. See People v. Superior Court, 53 0
P.2d 585, 588 (Cal. 1975) (consent was fruit of illegal
interrogation where, upon receiving Miranda warnings, defendant
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stated he did not want to discuss case, yet police subjected him
to interrogation and then obtained permission to search
premises); People v. Cleburn, 782 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989);
State v. Wolfe, 657 P.2d 227, 229 (Or. 1983).
With respect to the state's claim that Winters' interrogation and requests cannot be construed as exploitation of the
prior illegality (State's Brief at 34), the state is incorrect.
Here, Carr failed and refused to pay attention to Kiriluk's
invocation while the interrogation was in Carr's control, then he
specifically turned the matter over to Winters to obtain consent
to search the apartment. The taint cannot be purged by handing
the baton to another officer. It is undisputed that after Kiriluk
invoked his rights, Carr allowed Winters to question Kiriluk and
obtain his consent to search. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,
687-88 (1988), prohibits the government from circumventing
constitutional rights with use of such tactics. The state has
failed to articulate an exception to this established doctrine.
With respect to the prejudice analysis, the state again
fails to identify any "direct evidence of the murder."

Rather,

it attempts to dilute the importance of the prosecutor's "key"
evidence going to the "motive theory." (State's Brief at 35.) The
state also disregards that additional evidence in this case was
circumstantial and clouded with credibility concerns. (See
Opening Brief, Points I.B. & II.C.)
POINT III. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTION, KIRILUK'S
OBJECTION TO WINTERS' TESTIMONY IDENTIFIED THE FACTORS UNDER
RIMMASCH THAT MUST BE PROVEN BY THE STATE BEFORE SUCH
CONCLUSIVE TESTIMONY MAY BE ADMITTED.
15

The state asserts Kiriluk failed to properly preserve his
objections to Winters' testimony that liquid found in Kiriluk's
apartment constituted precursor. (State's Brief at 36-38.) Yet,
Kiriluk objected to the testimony on foundational grounds and on
the basis that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.
The state disregards that Kiriluk's objections mirrored the
factors set forth in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
Under Rimmasch, and State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah
1996) , before admitting scientific conclusions into evidence, the
state is required to prove (1) the inherent reliability of underlying techniques used to determine the conclusions; (2) proper
application of the techniques; and (3) that the evidence is more
probative than prejudicial.

Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641.

The Utah

Supreme Court classified the first two factors as "foundational."
Id. at n.2; see Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403.
concerns Rule 403, Utah R. Evid.

The third factor

See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641.

Specifically, counsel for Kiriluk stated the following in a
pre-trial hearing where he objected to the testimony:
MR. MAURO [COUNSEL FOR KIRILUK:] The substance found in the
house was apparently some substance in a pickle jar. I
don't know what that was. But my guess is that Detective
Winters will testify that he believed the substance was used
in the manufacture of methamphetamine. And, again, we think

there are foundational

problems with no toxficolocrvl

test,

and we think it's not relevant under 401 and 402. It's not
relevant under 404 and subject to 403 because it's more
preju[di]cial than probative.
COURT: So what you're talking about is the witness will
testify that he observed the chemical, flex tubing, whatever
else in the home, that was not retained. It will not be
presented for evidence, he'll simply testify that it's
consistent with a methamphetamine lab or chemical lab; is
that what you're saying.
[PROSECUTOR]: I'm not introducing that. I have no intent
16

to ask any questions about beakers or flasks or trying to
make amphetamines.
What I do have is that he found a beaker of a substance
which he will testify is a precursor to methamphetamine.
The defense has already gone into that.[8] We had a
hearing where they asked them all these questions, and they
testified that that stuff, in my opinion, is a precursor to
methamphetamine.
And that's all I want, is that there was a jar full of
this liquid, it's a precursor for methamphetamine. It goes
along with the state's theory that this is what this whole
murder is about. So that it's a precursor to
methamphetamine, that's all I want to get it in for.

MR. MAURO: There's a foundational
problem to that,
because
we don't have any documentmentation
[sic! to prove that, and
for the officers
to just say, we found a pickle iar in the
house with a precursor chemical to methamphetamine, I don't
think there's an adequate foundation that the court should
allow that evidence
in.
COURT:

All right.

The objection is overruled....

(R. 564-66 (emphasis added).)9

At trial, counsel again objected

on foundational grounds to Winters' testimony that the liquid was
a precursor. (R. 940-41.)
The objections plainly concerned the lack of scientifically
acceptable techniques used to establish the conclusion.10 No
other interpretation can be given to the foundational objections,

8

The prosecutor's statement, "the defense has already gone
into that," refers to testimony at the pre-trial motion to suppress
hearing. There Winters testified that he observed items in the home
that he "believed" to be precursor based on his experience (R. 44142; 449). However, because the items "weren't necessary in this
case" they were not seized. (R. 449.)
9

Notwithstanding the record, the state makes the incredible
assertion that Kiriluk made no appropriate objection "nor
any

timely

objection

on even general

foundational

grounds" to preserve

this issue on appeal. (State's Brief at 38 (emphasis added) .) The
state completely disregards plain, pre-trial objections contained
in the record.
10

Reference in the objection to the toxicology report concerns
chemical analysis and science.
See Webster's Ninth Collegiate
Dictionary 1248 (1985) (toxicology defined as "a science
that deals
with poisons and their effect and with the problems involved").
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and the state offers none. The issue was properly preserved.
With respect to the merits, if Winters had merely testified
that items found in the apartment were "consistent" with the use
or manufacture of methamphetamine (testimony concerning mere
observations), the evidence may have been admissible. However,
Winters testified conclusively that a jar contained a precursor
for methamphetamine - - a scientific fact.

(R. 955.)

Winters' "conclusions" were more prejudicial than probative,
lacked foundation, and were unreliable. Also, they were suspicious; they were not based in a toxicology report that the prosecutor possessed but never disclosed. (R. 951.) "[I]t can be
said that evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter
of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible."
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640. The testimony was impermissible.
The state does not deny that the trial court committed error
as a matter of law under Rimmasch and Crosby in permitting
Winters' conclusions into evidence.
With respect to the state's prejudice analysis, the state
asserts that other evidence challenged on appeal as inadmissible
supports the determination that the error was harmless.11

The

state also relies on the circumstantial evidence and testimony of
witnesses presenting credibility concerns.
39.) That evidence is inconclusive.

(See State's Brief at

Here, the jury likely relied

on Winters' conclusive and improper testimony to find "motive"
11

The state relies on the methamphetamine recipe which Kiriluk
has challenged as inadmissible. (See Opening Brief, Point II.)
18

and to convict Kiriluk.

Without the inadmissible evidence, there

existed a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
Kiriluk.
POINT IV. THE STATE# S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE SEROLOGY
TESTS ARE ILLOGICAL.
The state asserts Kiriluk's argument concerning the state's
discovery violation "lacks merit because it is not clearly established that a serology test was ever conducted. Moreover, defendant cannot show that he ever anticipated blood would be found on
Damon's t-shirt and was therefore prejudiced by testimony that no
blood was found thereon."

(State's Brief at 40.)

With respect to whether testing was conducted, the state acknowledges Carr's testimony to that effect. Incredibly, however,
the state asserts "defendant has failed to establish...that the
report in question ever existed." (Id. at 42.) The state is incorrect.

The record supports that testing occurred. In addition,

once Kiriluk made the discovery request for serology test results
(R. 43-45, 69-70, 133-37), he had no further obligation here.
The duty belonged to the prosecutor to respond completely
and honestly to the discovery request. See State v. Archuleta,
850 P.2d 1232, 1242-43 (Utah) (prosecutor's duty to respond is
continuous and applies when prosecutor voluntarily produces
information), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993).
The state suggests the prosecutor had no duty to report the
results because "he was unaware that any serology test had been
conducted and no [] report had been provided [to] him." (State's
Brief at 42.) That is insufficient. For discovery purposes,
19

"[i]nformation known to police officers working on a case is
charged to the prosecution since the officers are part of the
prosecution team.

Neither the prosecutor nor officers working on

a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to
a defendant."

State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984)

(cites omitted).

In this case, the state failed to advise the

defense with respect to results -- all the while allowing the
defense to believe that no analysis or test was conducted. The
state violated its obligation to provide continuing discovery by
failing to advise the defense of the truth.
The state does not dispute that to the extent a "test" or
"examination" was not

conducted, it was error for the trial court

to permit Carr to testify with respect to serology test results.
(See Opening Brief, Point IV.B.) Carr had no qualifications that
would allow him to testify that no blood was found on the shirt,
and there was no basis for the testimony. Carr's testimony also
was more prejudicial than probative in violation of Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388. The state's failure to address the merits of Point
IV.B. set forth in Kiriluk's Opening Brief compels the determination that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony.
As for the state's claim that Kiriluk suffered no prejudice,
the state relies in part on the trial court's determination that
"in light of evidence adduced that both codefendant and defendant
'were in the presence of the deceased' at the time of the murder," serology results would not have impacted defendant's case.
(State's Brief at 41.) The trial court and state both disregard

20

that evidence allegedly placing Kiriluk in the presence of the
victim at the time of the murder was circumstantial and clouded
with credibility issues. (See Opening Brief, Points I.B. & IV.C.)
The trial judge improperly made credibility and sufficiency
determinations to justify admitting the baseless testimony into
evidence.

See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989)

(the sufficient-evidence analysis "is not the standard by which
harmless error determinations are to be made").
As for the state's assertion that "defendant cannot show
that he ever anticipated blood would be found on Damon's t-shirt"
(State's Brief at 40), that is incorrect.12

Kiriluk's counsel

explained to the trial court that the defense anticipated that
blood would be found on the shirt. (R. 1023.) Kiriluk's defense
was that Damon alone took the victim to the tree and murdered
him. (R. 1021-23.) Since the state presented only circumstantial
evidence and evidence clouded with credibility issues in its
case, it is reasonably likely that there would have been a more

12

The state also asserts that defendant failed to adduce
evidence supporting his defense.
(State's Brief at 42.) That
assertion improperly suggests Kiriluk carried the burden of proof
here, and is in direct conflict with Utah law. See State v. Knoll,
712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985).
Kiriluk's burden was limited. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P. 2d
775, 779 (Utah App. 1990) . A defendant assumes the burden of
producing some evidence (i.e. that blood was found on Damon's
shirt) only if the state's evidence failed to provide some kind of
evidentiary foundation for the defense. Id. at 779 (citations omitted) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1995). That is, since the state
led Kiriluk to believe that it had not tested the shirt, Kiriluk
reasonably believed the state would not be able to use the shirt to
discredit his defense that Damon murdered the victim. The state's
lack of evidence would have provided a foundation for the defense.
Kiriluk had no obligation here. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.
21

favorable result in this case for Kiriluk if the baseless
evidence had not been presented.
The improper, surprise evidence presented by the state
suggested Damon did not murder the victim, thereby directly
inculpating Kiriluk. Because the state disregarded discovery and
evidentiary rules in presenting the evidence, Kiriluk was denied
the opportunity to consider the test results and to present
evidence concerning deficiencies in the testing. Kiriluk also was
prevented from questioning the techniques and methods used.
Reversal'is appropriate here.
POINT V. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT PREJUDICIAL
HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
The state claims Kiriluk waived his objection to hearsay
testimony elicited by the state from Rebecca.

The state

disregards that the Utah Supreme Court did not reject an argument
on procedural grounds that was presented under similar circumstances in State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998). In
that case, the Utah Supreme Court considered an objection on the
merits even though the objection was made after the witness
finished testifying. Id. That case is analogous to this matter.
In addition, the trial court here entertained the merits of
the hearsay objection and initially agreed to provide a
cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the inadmissible
testimony. (R. 934; 942.) Because the trial court addressed the
issue on the merits, this Court is required to consider the issue
on appeal.

See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah

1991); State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992).
22

With regard to the merits, the state claims that "defense
counsel opened the door" to the admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence, and that the hearsay statements
were against the declarant's (Damon's) interest and therefore
admissible. The state's assertions are legally incorrect.
Rebecca's objectionable hearsay testimony was elicited by
the prosecutor on re-direct after cross-examination.

During

cross by the defense, Rebecca disclosed that Damon made statements concerning his own involvement in the offense. (R. 927.) On
redirect, the prosecutor asked "What else did Damon tell you ..."
Rebecca disclosed that Damon said Kiriluk "slashed [Brown's]
throat and then stabbed him in one side and it came out the
other." (R. 930-31.)
The state relies on Rule 804(b)(3), Utah R. Evid., to assert
the objectionable hearsay statement was admissible as a statement
against declarant's (Damon's) interest. Since the Utah rules are
based on the federal rules, see Prelim. Note to Utah R. Evid., it
is proper to examine decisions under the federal rules here. See
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986).
Federal courts have separated a declarant/codefendant's
statements into two categories: those implicating declarant only
in the offense, and those implicating other parties. The first
category of statements is admissible while the second category
does little to subject declarant to liability.
The second category of statements is inadmissible hearsay.
Those statements are usually made to shift or decrease criminal
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liability from declarant to another party. A declarant does
little to demonstrate the trustworthiness and reliability
necessary under the hearsay exceptions by taking on the blame of
a minor role and shifting the greater portion of blame to
another. See U.S. v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 883 (10th Cir.) (to
the extent a statement not against declarant's interest is
severable from other statements satisfying Rule 804(b)(3), such
statement should be excluded), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989);
State v. Lilly, 581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1978); see also, Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("Due to his strong
motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a
codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are
less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence" (quoting Bruton v.
U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (in the context of codefendant's
statements and the confrontation clause)).13
With regard to the state's "open-door" argument, even if
defense counsel "opened" a door by eliciting statements from
Rebecca concerning Damon's participation in the murder, those
statements would not allow the court to admit hearsay statements
in violation of the rules of evidence. See U.S. v. Hazelett, 32
F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (8th Cir. 1994) (unavailable declarant's
narrative is not admissible under 804(b)(3) merely because a
portion of the narrative was admitted into evidence).
Finally, there was no invited error.

13

Counsel objected after

The state does not dispute that Kiriluk's rights under the
confrontation clause were violated by admission of the hearsay
statements. (See Opening Brief at 47-49.)
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Rebecca testified, and requested that the trial court provide the
jury with a cautionary instruction. (R. 934; 942.) That is all
that was required to preserve the issue. The trial court's later
refusal to give an instruction unless Kiriluk submitted it in
writing was unprecedented and unnecessary to preserve the issue.
POINT VI.

THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE APPLIES HERE.

Throughout its brief, the state disputes the prejudice of
the errors, relying on Rebecca, Chablis and Jolynn's testimony,
which consisted only of circumstantial evidence and was clouded
with credibility concerns. The state also relies on evidence that
Kiriluk has challenged as inadmissible on appeal.14
The trial court compensated for the state's lack
evidence

of

direct

by admitting evidence obtained in violation of (1) Kiri-

luk' s rights per Miranda, (2) the 4th Amendment, (3) Rimmasch,
(4) a prosecutor's duty to provide continuing discovery, and (5)
the hearsay rules. The errors should undermine this Court's
confidence that a fair trial was had.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and herein,
this matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

14

For example, in connection with Points I.E. and II.D., the
state asserts that any error in admitting the evidence in question
was not prejudicial, and relies on Rebecca's testimony concerning
Damon's hearsay statements, which is at issue at Point V.
In
connection with Point III, the state claims that allowing Winters
to testify definitively to the scientific properties of the liquid
was not prejudicial in part because a methamphetamine recipe was
admitted into evidence. Yet, Kiriluk challenged the admissibility
of the recipe in Point II.
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